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Abstract
I offer a novel argument for spacetime substantivalism: we should
take the spacetime of general relativity to be a substance because of its
active role in gravitational causation. As a clear example of this causal
behavior I offer the cosmological constant, a term in the most general
form of the Einstein field equations which causes free-floating objects
to accelerate apart. This acceleration cannot, I claim, be causally
explained except by reference to spacetime itself.
1 Introduction
Although the era of Newtonian physics is past, the controversy between sub-
stantivalist and relationist conceptions of space and time that began with
Newton and Leibniz has not subsided. The three-dimensional Euclidean
space of classical physics has been replaced with the four-dimensional, vari-
ably curved spacetime of general relativity (GR), but the question faced by
the classical physicists and their philosophical contemporaries remains much
the same today: What sort of entity is spacetime; indeed, is it any sort of
entity at all? A relationist answers in the negative, holding that all spatial
and temporal properties are reducible to properties of material objects, while
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a substantivalist maintains that spatiotemporal features are not so reducible,
so that reference to these properties commits us to understanding spacetime
as an entity existing separate from the objects contained within it. This is
the ontological problem of space and time.
Today the ontological problem divides philosophers of physics into many
camps. Some have suggested, and others (Rynasiewicz 1996) have explicitly
argued, that the debate is outmoded in the context of GR, and that the rela-
tionist and substantivalist positions have become indistinguishable.1 Those
still concerned with the problem agree that GR is incompatible with rela-
tionist views on inertial motion (Sklar 1976, 216-221), but there is some con-
troversy over whether inertial properties are really spatiotemporal properties
(Earman and Norton 1987) or whether they can be explained as dispositions
of objects instead of features of spacetime (Teller 1991). The correct answer
to the ontological problem may seem to be a matter of “first philosophy,” a
purely interpretive question. To the contrary, I offer here an argument from
empirical physics to metaphysical conclusions, and hopefully a satisfactory
resolution of the ontological problem.
At the time of GR’s inception, the most well-known and prominent objec-
tion to substantivalism was Mach’s principle of the relativity of inertia. In an
attempt to vindicate the relationist ideas of Mach and make possible a static
distribution of matter in the universe, Einstein introduced the cosmological
constant (Λ) into the field equations of GR. Here I argue that because Λ
manifests itself as a constant average curvature of empty spacetime, a built-
in tendency of the universe to expand, it is an instance of nontrivial causal
powers that we ought to ascribe to spacetime itself. Ironically, then, it seems
that observations of a nonzero Λ provide evidence for the substantivalist po-
sition. For this reason, philosophers of physics should pay close attention to
astronomical data that indicate a possible nonzero cosmological constant.
2 Einstein’s cosmological term
It is widely recognized that one of Einstein’s objectives in introducing Λ was
to make possible static solutions to the field equations. Less well known is
his early hope that Λ could help make GR compatible with Mach’s principle.
1For a refutation of these claims, see Hoefer (1998).
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Without Λ, the field equations are
Rij − 1
2
Rgij = κTij. (1)
It is easily established that Eq. (1) admits a solution with no matter content,
i.e. Tij = 0 – assuming standard boundary conditions, this is flat Minkowski
spacetime. Einstein viewed the possibility of an empty universe as incompat-
ible with Mach’s claim that the inertial properties of any possible universe
should be fully determined by its matter content. But he believed that his
(1917) revision of the field equations to include the cosmological constant,
Rij − 1
2
Rgij + Λgij = κTij, (2)
had no solution for Tij = 0, removing one obstacle to a Machian interpreta-
tion of GR (see Earman 2001, 193). This hope was foiled by the discovery
of the De Sitter solution (cf. Eq. 5).
Machian or not, Λ’s full significance to the broader substantivalist-relationist
debate remains unaddressed, for the possibility of absolute motion in space it-
self is not the only point of disagreement between the two schools of thought.
The relationist is committed to the claim that all supposed spatiotemporal
properties are reducible to properties of objects. This ought to include not
just motion, but also any additional properties that might be ascribed to
spacetime. Does Λ represent such a property, and if so, is it reducible in a
way that conforms to relationism? This question becomes more pressing in
light of recent astronomical discoveries indicating a positive value for Λ (see
Cohn 1998, 12).2
3 A causal argument for substantivalism
To see what sort of causal role Λ plays in GR, we must first examine the
mechanism of gravitational causation in the theory. While Λ’s repulsion may
not be a gravitational force in the ordinary sense, the form of Eq. (2) does, I
2Other possible explanations for the cosmological repulsion include a contribution to
the effective Λ from the energy density of the quantum vacuum, or a form of exotic matter
with negative pressure, called “quintessence.” Let us set these aside as beyond the scope
of this paper, and concern ourselves from here on with a “bare” cosmological constant
appearing in the field equations (2).
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believe, justify the claim that Λ is the same sort of thing as gravitation. Its
role in the field equations is to influence, by itself or in combination with other
terms, the metric structure of spacetime, and thereby to affect the physical
behavior of matter. This is exactly the sort of influence that accounts for
gravitational forces in GR, the only difference being that Λ does not depend
on matter as its source. Therefore, I shall begin my analysis of Λ’s causal
behavior with a study of gravitational causation.
Here I use the term ‘causation’ in a somewhat nonstandard way. As Sklar
(1976, 75) notes, neither the spacetime structure nor the matter distribution
precedes the other. Rather, GR tells us which distributions of matter are
compatible with which spacetime structures, and vice versa. Nonetheless,
this lawlike connection does allow for apparently causal relationships within
spacetime, like the case of one object moving toward another under the influ-
ence of gravity. If the object had been alone in space, it would not have moved
at all. I therefore suggest that causation in GR should be interpreted after
the fashion of Mellor (1980, 287) who writes that cause-effect relationships
mediated by spacetime structure should be expressed “by counterfactuals:
had the action not occurred, the structure of spacetime would have been
different.”
Gravitational radiation is perhaps the starkest example of spacetime’s
seemingly independent causal behavior, and so I shall attempt to see if a
good substantivalist argument can be built around it. Consider a binary
star system, with two stars of equal mass rotating around their common
center, forming a gravitational quadrupole (see Rindler 2001, 330-335). As
time passes, the radius of their orbit will decrease and the speed of rotation
will increase, reducing the total kinetic energy of the system. The missing
energy is released in the form of a gravitational wave, consisting of a region of
metric curvature that propagates at the speed of light. Suppose that a wave
released in this way at time t1 comes into contact at time t2 with a simple
detector, e.g. a pair of masses connected by a spring. The wave will induce
tidal forces on each mass, causing the system to oscillate and thus to gain
kinetic energy. An astrophysicist observing the binary star system and the
detector might ask two questions: (a) what entity was the immediate cause
of the oscillations in the detector, and (b) between t1 and t2, what entity
possessed the energy that left the star system at t1 and entered the detector
at t2?
The point of this example is that a substantivalist has a satisfactory
answer to questions (a) and (b), while a relationist does not. From the
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perspective of substantivalism, it makes perfect sense to say that the moving
region of metric curvature was the cause of the oscillations and the carrier
of the energy. But there is no immediately obvious way for the relationist
to explain what happened without compromising his position or departing
in some significant way from the common-sense story about gravitational
causation that I sketched previously.3
3.1 Spacetime: metric or manifold?
A promising route for the relationist may be to accept GR’s description of
gravitational waves, but deny that metrical structure should be construed
as a property of spacetime. This amounts to arguing that the manifold –
the set of spacetime points themselves, considered without reference to the
metrical structure – is the only proper subject for substantivalism. This
allows the relationist to claim that only the manifold counts as ‘spacetime
itself.’ Since the energy of the gravitational wave is contained in the metric,
which describes only the gravitational field, it is not a property of spacetime.
The restriction of substantivalists to mere manifold substantivalism might be
justified by appeal to Earman and Norton (1987).
Earman and Norton argue that the identification of spacetime with the
manifold draws a clear distinction between spacetime and its contents. In
GR, they write,
...geometric structures, such as the metric tensor, are clearly phys-
ical fields in spacetime... Consider, for example, a gravitational
wave propagating through space. In principle its energy could
be collected and converted into other types of energy, such as
heat or light or even massive particles. If we do not classify such
energy bearing structures as the wave as contained within space-
time, then we do not see how we can consistently divide between
container and contained. (1987, 519)
But this is quite an impoverished conception of spacetime, as Maudlin
(1988, 87) notes. Many structural properties which we normally take to
be spatiotemporal – e.g., distances, intervals, volumes, past and future – are
3Further trouble for the relationist may arise from the possibility of sourceless plane
wave solutions to the field equations, but it seems open to the relationist to reject these
solutions as unphysical.
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properties of the metric, not the manifold. The only such properties possessed
by the manifold itself are its dimension and its topological and differential
structure. Most glaring, perhaps, is the fact that the bare manifold does not
distinguish the time dimension from the three spatial dimensions (Hoefer
1996, 11).
Of course, a consistent division between container and contained is the
first step on the road to relationism. For substantivalism entails at least
one significant similarity between spacetime and its contents: both exist. If
we assume from the start that spacetime can have no effect upon (other)
existing objects, it seems we have already conceded much to the relationist.
Instead of being an a priori distinction underpinning the ontological debate,
the container/contained distinction should be seen as a point of contention.
One might wonder what sort of ontology Earman and Norton have in
mind for the metric. By their reckoning, it is a physical field, so perhaps we
should take it to be a field of force. Instead of spacetime structure, perhaps
the gravitational field is the dynamical medium described by GR’s metric.
But the metric is no mere force field. As mentioned above, it determines
causal structure, distance, past, future, and so on. No other force plays
such a broad role in defining the physical arena of discourse. In fact, other
field theories depend explicitly upon many of these metrical properties; for
example, the inverse-square law governing the attenuation of the electric
field is meaningless without a measure of distance. So it seems that the
metrical field is not a field of force, it is a field of geometry. If geometry is a
material field, it is wildly different from all other forms of matter. It should
be identified as such only under the pressing force of a compelling argument.
Earman and Norton’s argument is not, I believe, compelling enough. I
fail to see why the possibility of causal interaction between spacetime and
its material contents prevents us from distinguishing between spacetime and
ordinary matter. In fact, it is easy to do so: as Earman and Norton note, the
stress-energy of the metric takes the form of a pseudo-tensor, while normal
matter’s stress-energy is specified by the tensor Tij. In Eqs. (1) and (2)
there is a simple way to discriminate between spacetime and its contents:
the left-hand side of the equation describes the spacetime structure, and the
right-hand side describes the contents.
This interpretation not only maintains the container/contained distinc-
tion insofar as possible, it also holds to the spirit of the historical dispute by
identifying motion and inertia as spatiotemporal properties. Leibniz’s origi-
nal arguments for relationism rested on the indistinguishability of universes
6
in distinct states of uniform motion, or universes in which every object is
translated by a fixed distance. Newton’s reply, the famous “bucket argu-
ment,” appealed to the experimental consequences of absolute acceleration.
To accept an interpretation (mere manifold substantivalism) which holds
that states of motion are not spatiotemporal states would be to disregard
the most basic assumptions of both Newton and Leibniz. If it were philo-
sophically well-motivated, such an interpretation would call into question the
very distinction between substantivalism and relationism, just as Rynasiewicz
argues. But my main point is that in forming our concept of spacetime, we
should try to hold onto as much of the classical concept of space and time as
our new theories allow. Manifold substantivalism does not accomplish this.
3.2 “Radiation” without energy: Hoefer on
gravitational energy and causation
There may still be hope for a “liberalized relationism” of the sort advocated
by Teller (1991). This form of relationism recognizes possible as well as actual
spatiotemporal relations as proper subjects for science. It is conceivable that
a liberalized relationist could form an account of gravitational radiation that
expresses its effects as constraints upon possible events. Such an account
would hold that the (purely relational) distribution and motion of matter
is connected in a lawlike way with the possible, as well as actual, motion
of objects. Even in the case of gravitational radiation, spacetime plays an
intermediary role in causation, and so this phenomenon might be reducible
to a lawlike connection between the configuration of one matter system (the
binary star system) and the possible spatiotemporal paths open to another
system (the detector). I would be surprised to see a relationist explanation of
this sort that does not also entail the reducibility of other (non-gravitational)
fields and forces to merely relational constraints upon possible motion, but
I do not unequivocally deny that this is possible. Perhaps relationists would
welcome such reducibility.
A position like Teller’s suffers from its disregard for the energetic nature
of gravitational radiation. It is hard to deny the existence of a structure
which can carry energy; if energy is not a mark of substance, one may be left
with no reason to believe in the existence of matter. The best move for the
relationist may be to deny that gravitational radiation is energetic. Hoefer
(2000) makes exactly this argument.
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GR obeys a limited sort of energy-momentum conservation law:
Tij;j = 0 (3)
Note that this law restricts only the covariant derivative of the stress-energy.
A true conservation law would require a zero partial derivative, i.e, Tij,j = 0.
As it is, the matter field described by Tij can gain or lose energy and momen-
tum. In fact, this is exactly what happens in the example of gravitational
radiation: the apparent transfer of energy from matter to the gravitational
field.
There is a term that can be taken to describe the energy of the grav-
itational field: the gravitational stress-energy pseudo-tensor tij. The sum
Tij + tij is conserved, but only for spacetimes satisfying very stringent condi-
tions. In particular, this “total energy” is only conserved in asymptotically
flat spacetimes, ones which approach flat Minkowski spacetime at infinity.
The actual universe does not meet this condition. Also, because it is not a
proper tensor, tij exhibits some strange properties. It does not possess well-
defined values at particular points; at any point, there exists a coordinate
transformation which will take tij to zero (Hoefer 2000, 193). Thus there is
no clear way to localize gravitational energy.
On these grounds, Hoefer argues that we lack sufficient reason to accept
that the metric can possess energy. From the lack of a conservation law,
we know that GR can countenance a net gain or loss in the energy of an
isolated system. We also know that the energy of a gravitational wave is
not localizable, and so behaves quite differently from material energy. It is
therefore possible to maintain that the only genuine energy (Hoefer’s term)
is localizable energy. On this picture, when a gravitational wave is “emitted”
its source loses energy, and when the wave is “received” the receiver gains
energy, and that’s all there is to it. Energy disappears from the source upon
emission, and energy appears in the receiver upon reception.
If Hoefer is right about this, there is nothing stopping the relationist from
claiming that the causal behavior of a gravitational wave is no more than a
primitive lawlike correlation between the source and the receiver. Thus con-
strued, gravitational waves do not really exist at all, and so can provide no
evidence for substantivalism. But Hoefer’s account is not obviously the right
way to understand gravitational energy. GR does represent the metrical
field as causally efficacious – gravitational waves have the power to accel-
erate matter. If such powers are not a sure sign that an entity possesses
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energy, one might ask what basis we have for ascribing energy to material
objects? In fact, one might credibly argue that energy is just an expression
of an entity’s potential to cause motion, and if the gravitational stress-energy
pseudo-tensor describes such causal potential it should be accepted as gen-
uine energy.
In the absence of a concrete proof, it may be best to interpret a theory
conservatively. But which is more conservative: to accept that gravitational
waves transmit energy which is nonlocal, or to maintain that one physical
system can cause acceleration in another without the transmission of energy?
Hoefer is right in one regard: I cannot prove that the metric possesses
energy as real as that of matter. The interpretation of gravitational energy
that he outlines may be counterintuitive, but it has not been shown to be
false, and so it remains an option for the relationist. Thus, although GR’s
description of gravitational causation seems to favor the substantivalist, it
also admits a possible relationist interpretation. I will now reveal how Λ
changes the rules in this regard by exerting causal influence over material
objects while remaining unexplainable in terms of material causes, and by
ascribing an undeniably real density of energy to empty space.
4 From Lambda to substantivalism
The form of the field equations (2) suggests a natural interpretation of Λ.
Whatever influence Λ has on the motion of objects should, I submit, be seen
as a gravitational effect. It affects which values of the metric are compatible
with which matter distributions, and so helps to determine the value of the
gravitational field.
Let us consider the qualitative features of a universe with nonzero Λ. In
a region empty of matter, represented by Tij = 0, Eq. (2) gives
Rij = Λgij (4)
so for Λ 6= 0 we have Rij 6= 0. Taking the trace of this Ricci tensor, we
find that the scalar curvature is R = 4Λ. Thus we can immediately see that
the new field equations entail constant average curvature of spacetime in the
absence of matter. The basic, sourceless solution to the field equations is no
longer flat Minkowski spacetime; instead, it is dictated by the value of Λ.
One might wonder whether Λ could be viewed as a field of its own, sep-
arate from the metric field, whose effects combine with those of gravity. In
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fact, this is not really possible. GR is a non-linear theory, and so contri-
butions to the field from separate sources do not simply add together. Λ’s
contribution to the metric field cannot in general be isolated from the con-
tribution of matter sources.
The cosmological constant is (or describes) a property of something. I
submit that Λ describes a property of spacetime itself, specifically a basic,
“unperturbed” amount of curvature that is altered, but not entirely created,
by the presence of matter. In a universe with Λ = 0, this basic state is flat
Minkowski spacetime, and gravitational causation between physical objects
is mediated by variations in curvature due to matter. In a universe with
nonzero Λ, on the other hand, spacetime does not merely mediate causation
between objects. It is also quite capable of causing motion among the objects.
4.1 Lambda’s causal powers
A nonzero value of Λ in the field equations (2) leads to considerable differences
in the motion of material objects. To form an accurate model of Λ’s effect
on matter, we shall first consider its influence on a few isolated test objects
in an otherwise empty universe. Consider the case of two test objects alone
in otherwise empty space, separated by radius r. Choosing a frame with a
test object O1 (of trivial mass) at the center, we can predict the motion of
another test object O2 by solving the field equations (2) for the spacetime
at a distance r away from a massless object. The solution is the de Sitter
metric,
ds2 = −(1− 1
3
Λr2)dt2 +
dr2
1− 1
3
Λr2
+ r2dθ2 + r2 sin θdφ2. (5)
The potential can be approximated as Φ = (−g00 − 1)/2, which gives
Φ(r) = −1
6
Λr2. (6)
This is the potential at the location of O2, a distance r from O1. O2 will then
move under the influence of a gravitational force given by F = −m∇Φ =
−m(1
3
Λr), where m is O2’s (negligible, by assumption) mass. O2 will move
under this force with an acceleration a = (1
3
Λr), where positive a signifies
motion away from O1. This repulsive (positive) force is not the result of any
interaction between the two masses. This becomes clearer if we remove O1;
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r = 0 then signifies an unoccupied reference point. Even in this case, O2
is influenced by a force – it is accelerated by a = (1
3
Λr), a quantity that
depends only on the values of r and Λ. No other object is causing O2’s
motion. The only explanation for it is Λ, i.e. the constant average curvature
of the spacetime.
I have no illusions that this model will satisfy a relationist. After all, with
no objects in the test universe aside from O2, the idea that O2 is accelerating
at all is unacceptable to a relationist. For one thing, there is no possible
experiment in this empty universe that could discover O2’s motion – the Λ
repulsion acts like a gravitational force, and so O2 will feel no inertial forces
as it accelerates under the influence of this force. Without any other objects
to use as reference points, the relationist might argue, it is meaningless for
me to say that O2 is in motion. The apparent acceleration is just a mis-
leading feature of the theory, and there is no need to causally explain this
unobservable “acceleration” at all. So much for Λ’s causal influence on O2.
This objection is apt, and it correctly points out that by referring to an
unobservable absolute acceleration, a feature which can exist only if substan-
tivalism is correct, the above model begs the question. But this problem is
easily fixed. Put O1 back into the test universe, but place it very far from O2,
so that its worldline does not lie in O2’s past light cone.
4 This means that
there can be no causal connection between O1 and O2 – they are far enough
apart that no signals have had a chance to pass between them. Now we can
use O1 as a reference point to measure the motion of O2, and sure enough,
O2 will accelerate away from O1 at a rate proportional to r. This cannot be
the result of any interaction between the two objects since, by assumption,
they are too far apart for any signal moving at or below the speed of light to
have gone between them. Nonetheless, any observer lying within the future
light cones of both O1 and O2 can measure their motion.
It is hard to envisage something more substantival than spacetime which
is curved in the absence of matter. To preserve relationism in spite of this, the
relationist must demonstrate that the constant curvature can be explained
only as properties of physical objects, without reference to spacetime except
in terms of actual and possible relations between objects. Is a relationist
reduction of this sort possible for Λ, and if so, how much is lost in the
reduction? I do not doubt that a persistent relationist could describe Λ’s
4This is possible in a De Sitter universe because of the De Sitter event horizon which
manifests at r =
√
3
Λ .
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effects as mere relational properties, but the price will be high. Considering
my example of distant objects moving apart under the influence of Λ, the
relationist would have to posit a brute fact that material objects possess a
tendency to accelerate away from one another at a rate proportional only
to the distance between them. But this could not be described as a causal
relational property of material objects, since it has been established that
objects in a Λ universe will move apart even when no causal connection
between them is possible. So a relationist explanation of Λ would entail that
spontaneous acceleration can occur without any cause, but in a lawlike way
that can be described by the analysis of this section.
In Section 3 we saw that the metric of GR is capable of carrying causal
signals between physical objects. Λ seems to be something more: a de-
scription of causal relationships that hold between curved spacetime and its
material constituents. A relationist could deny the possibility of such rela-
tionships as a matter of principle, but this would oblige him to deny that
the sort of motion described in the previous section is caused by anything
at all. Relationism then becomes the doctrine that spacetime describes a set
of spatiotemporal relations which spontaneously change without cause. This
is not a very attractive position, even if we accept the notion that lawlike
regularities might hold in the absence of causal connection.
4.2 Lambda’s undeniable energy
We saw in Section 3.2 that the relationist can avoid the implications of
the causal argument for substantivalism by denying that spacetime medi-
ates causal relationships between physical objects, and by denying that it
possesses energy. I have shown that in Λ universes the relationist cannot
deny spacetime’s causal powers without also abandoning causal talk about
a broad set of common-sensically causal phenomena. I will now show that
Λ’s presence also prevents the relationist from denying, as Hoefer does, that
empty space can possess energy.
We saw in Eq. (4) that Λ entails a nonzero average scalar curvature R
in the absence of matter sources. This constant curvature entails an energy
density of empty space, meaning that even empty regions will contain a
certain amount of energy manifested in the curvature. To see why this is so,
take Eq. (4) and insert it back into the original field equations (1):
Λgij − 1
2
(4Λ)gij = −Λgij = κTij. (7)
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We see that Λ’s influence is equivalent to a constant stress energy Tij =
−(Λ
κ
)gij. In a comoving frame, the first entry in the stress-energy tensor is
T00 = ρc
2, and in a weak field g00 = −c2, so the energy density of empty
space entailed by Λ is
ρΛ =
Λ
κ
. (8)
This does not mean that Λ is caused by a density of matter fields; rather, its
role in the field equations is equivalent to (or represents) a density of empty
space.
This is, I think, another way of conceptualizing the point I made at
the beginning of this section, that Λ represents the sourceless, unperturbed
curvature of spacetime. We can see from Eq. (8) that in a Λ universe, space
itself is a source for the gravitational field. Its contribution to the curvature
of the metric combines with that of other (material) sources in the usual non-
linear way described by the field equations of GR. And this contribution can
be seen as equivalent to a constant, nonzero energy density in the absence of
matter sources.
Because this stress-energy takes the form of a tensor Λgij, it is just as
localizable as the energy of matter fields described by Tij. Hoefer’s argument
against the reality of gravitational energy therefore does not apply. Λ’s en-
ergy meets all of the same criteria as “genuine” material energy, and so if
we want to maintain that Tij describes real energy, we had better accept the
reality of ρΛ as well.
Besides the fact that Hoefer’s argument has been bypassed, I can see no
easy way for the relationist to explain the energy density of empty space.
The density and total energy of the electric field (for example) depend only
upon the distribution of charge, i.e. the distribution of matter. Not so for
the repulsive gravitational field described by Λ. Its energy density does not
depend upon matter at all, and its total energy within a region is purely a
function of the volume of the region. It is possible for a liberalized relationist
of Teller’s sort to define the volume of empty space in terms of possible
spatial relations, but to say that such possibilia help determine the actual
total energy content of a region seems quite at odds with relationism.
I can conceive of a relationist theory of gravity incorporating all of the
phenomena described by Λ, but I believe that such a theory would contain
much needless complexity and require a considerable departure from our
basic concepts of what causation is and what sort of behavior requires causal
explanation. Therefore, a universe described by a cosmological constant of
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the sort conceived by Einstein is not a universe friendly to relationism. If the
universe’s expansion is found to be accelerating, and a cosmological constant
introduced into the field equations is the best explanation, then relationism
about space and time will become a far less defensible position.
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